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THE LEGAL ARCHITECTURE OF NATIONBUILDING: AN INTRODUCTION
Charles H. Norchi*
A nation may be said to consist of its territory, its people, and its laws.
-Abraham Lincoln1

I. TOWARD ARCHITECTONIC NATION-BUILDING
In the future, a historian studying the early twenty-first century will observe a
trend: numerous lawyers applying their skill sets to the problems of pathological states.
Our future historian will note that the topography of the post-Cold War international
system was marked by weakly-governed states failing.2 Fragile states eroded, frayed,
and disintegrated under stress, and their internal social processes became highly
susceptible to external forces. Powerful non-state actors, including private armies,
operated within the porous boundaries of entities that were once functioning polities.
Legal authority became divorced from political control as non-state actors wielded
naked power, challenging formal state structures and instruments of governance.
Within these unstable systems, populations suffered from personal insecurity and an
expectation of violence. The origins of failures were often indigenous conflicts that
manifested as intra-state violence or international wars, such as in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, East Timor, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kashmir, Somalia, Angola,
Liberia, Sierre Leone, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Afghanistan. In Iraq and
Afghanistan, regime change precipitated by foreign state intervention required
sustained reconstruction efforts.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law; Research Fellow, Ash Institute
for Democratic Governance and Innovation, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
I am grateful for thoughts and comments from Laura Underfkuffler, Andrew Willard, Christopher Knott,
and for assistance from the highly efficient library staff of the University of Maine School of Law. This
work is dedicated to the memory of Professor John D. Montgomery, teacher, friend, and nation-builder from
Japan to Afghanistan.
1. Abraham Lincoln, Congressional Address, Second Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 1, 1862).
2. Our future historian would also note a proliferation of literature and research programs dealing with
failed states and their reconstruction. See generally JAMES DOBBINS ET AL., THE BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO
NATION BUILDING (2007) [hereinafter DOBBINS ET AL., BEGINNER’S GUIDE]; JAMES DOBBINS ET AL.,
AMERICA’S ROLE IN NATION-BUILDING FROM GERMANY TO IRAQ (2003); JAMES DOBBINS ET AL., THE UN’S
ROLE IN NATION-BUILDING FROM THE CONGO TO IRAQ (2005); ASHRAF GHANI & CLARE LOCKHART,
FIXING FAILED STATES: A FRAMEWORK FOR REBUILDING A FRACTURED WORLD (2008). Two thoughtprovoking books by scholars of international political economy that have become standards are FRANCIS
FUKUYAMA, STATE-BUILDING: GOVERNANCE AND WORLD ORDER IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2004)
[hereinafter FUKUYAMA, STATE-BUILDING] and NATION-BUILDING: BEYOND AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ
(Francis Fukuyama ed., 2006) [hereinafter FUKUYAMA, NATION-BUILDING]. A study of comparative
development policies with special reference to Afghanistan is presented in Dennis A. Rondinelli & John
D. Montgomery, Reconstruction, Development, and Nation-Building: Prospects for Afghanistan, in
BEYOND RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN: LESSONS FROM DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE (John D.
Montgomery & Dennis A. Rondinelli eds., 2004). Of special interest to lawyers is JANE STROMSETH ET AL.,
CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS (2006).
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Our future historian would observe that in these and similar contexts, lawyers
possessing special skills and knowledge brought their tool kits to bear upon the many
dimensions of distressed, failed, and reconstituting states. This participation of lawyers
and the application of their tools inspired this Maine Law Review Symposium. The
contributors are concerned with nation-building as generally understood in the United
States: “state-building coupled with economic development.”3 The context is often
post-conflict reconstruction meets development4 because in this period of world
history, “[d]onors are compelled to practice nation-building when war displaces an
existing regime, or when it can no longer function effectively.”5 Our contributors bring
their own nuanced definitions of nation-building to this Symposium, but they share in
their understanding of the enterprise as an accretion of activities designed to transform
a state from a present pathological condition6 to a preferred future condition, one in
which the state is a functioning participant in the world community, and within which
the human dignity of the population is respected and protected.7 Once that goal is
achieved, the international community withdraws stabilization and nation-building
resources, and treats the state as a target of development.
The fundamental question is how to bring a population from a condition of
hopelessness to one of self-governance, sustainable growth, and viable participation
in the world community. As Michael Reisman has asked, “[w]hat are the strategies
available to communities in transition, for their process of redefinition, and what role
should the international community—an increasingly effective participant in all these
subcommunities—take in the process?”8 From the standpoint of the legal profession,
is there a portfolio of tasks and methods that are especially applicable to nationbuilding efforts and that signal a new moment or pivotal role for the lawyer in state
reconstruction and the associated work of nation-building?
The aim of this Symposium is to stimulate thinking about those questions among
scholars and practitioners by exploring whether there is a discernable legal architecture
of nation-building. Do apparently disparate nation-building enterprises lend

3. FUKUYAMA, NATION-BUILDING, supra note 2, at 3. Further, Fukuyama argues that “[n]ationbuilding encompasses two different types of activities, reconstruction and development.” Id. at 4. In this
Article, I use the terms “nation-building” and “state-building” interchangeably.
4. In this Symposium, Michael Reisman writes, “We use the term ‘development,’ to refer to decision
processes and decision outcomes which have been designed to induce the shaping and sharing of all values
within and among territorial communities in ways and with consequences approximating the goal values
of a world order of human dignity.” W. Michael Reisman, Development and Nation-Building: A
Framework For a Policy-Orientated Inquiry, 60 ME. L. REV. 309, 310 (2008).
5. Rondinelli & Montgomery, supra note 2, at 225-26.
6. Pathologies can range from state disintegration, to persistent armed conflict, to varied degrees of
institutional incapacity.
7. The state would meet the requirements of the Montevideo Convention of 1933 which prescribes,
“the state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent
population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other
states.” Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165
L.N.T.S. 19. This would be coupled with the state’s observance of the international human rights codex
and associated protections for the population.
8. W. Michael Reisman, Communities in Transition: Autonomy, Self-Governance and Independence,
Remarks During Crosscutting Theme II Roundtable (Apr. 3, 1998), in 87 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 248,
249 (1993).
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themselves to “structure,” by one definition of architecture?9 Can goals be better
achieved by a systemic arrangement of the elements of the structure? The contributors
to this volume explore these questions by considering the foundation and cornerstones
of the architecture. Thus, they join a conversation initiated by the earliest manuals for
designing a polity, such as Plato’s Republic10 and The Laws.11 Although presented in
vividly contemporary terms, the issues that are addressed in the articles and essays that
follow transcend the practical contexts to which they are applied. They present design
questions and choices that animate the legal architecture of nation-building. Architectural structure emerges from a design process which may begin with a sketch on the
back of an architect’s napkin, and may later evolve into a blueprint to guide site
selection and construction of the edifice. That process is guided by principles and the
science of planning and constructing, or “architectonics.”12 As nation-building
experience is accumulated and appraised in the growing literature, an effective
architectonic of nation-building will become apparent. In the language of the law, this
is jurisprudence. Following is a preliminary architectonic of nation-building that
emerges from the problems addressed and the solutions proposed by the contributors
to this Symposium.
II. MYTH AND NATION-BUILDING
Myths help shape the human ordering of things, and nation-building professionals
initially encounter three such myths.13 The first myth has to with the contemporary
nation-state, the second with the constitutions of nascent states, and the third with the
nation-building enterprise itself. These myths are important, in that they express “a
pattern of stable perspectives among the members of a collectivity.”14 Myths and myth
systems cannot be ignored, as their features constitute part of the operational code
within any community.
The first myth bearing directly on nation-building is the belief that the contemporary nation-state is resilient, enduringly sovereign, and a custodian of its population.15 Since the Treaty of Westphalia, populations have looked to nation-states to

9. WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 109 (2001) (defining
architecture as “the structure of anything”).
10. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Allan Bloom trans., Basic Books 1968).
11. PLATO, THE LAWS (Trevor J. Saunders trans., Penguin Books 1970).
12. WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 109 (2001).
13. A.V. Dicey wrote that “[t]he whole body of beliefs existing in any given age may generally be
traced to certain fundamental assumptions which at the time, whether they be actually true or false, are
believed by the mass of the world to be true with such confidence that they hardly appear to bear the
character of assumptions.” A.V. DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION
IN ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 20 (2d ed. 1914).
14. Harold D. Lasswell & Allan R. Holmberg, Toward a General Theory of Directed Value
Accumulation and Institutional Development, in POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT 354, 380
(Ralph Braibanti ed., 1969).
15. Thomas Hobbes wrote,
This is the Generation of that great Leviathan . . . One Person of whose Acts a great
Multitude, by mutual Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the
Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think
expedient, for their Peace and Common Defense.
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89-90 (Ernest Ryhs ed., E.P. Dutton & Co. 1914) (1651).
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satisfy a wide range of needs. Operating in a world community of similarly organized
units, these territorial political arrangements provide security for citizens while also
serving as bases of state power. In return for security, the people cede control and
confer an expectation of authority upon ruling state elites. This bargain is a foundation
of the state system and forms the delicate balance upon which world order turns.16 For
large swaths of the world’s population, this myth has been shattered.
In the post-Cold War international system, the myth of the state as protector and
provider of values resonated for much of the planet. But increasingly, weak and fragile
states collapsed and their sovereignty was pierced. People living within their borders
were often engulfed by armed conflict, and their human rights denied. Failed states
harbored exportable violence and became problems for an international system that
lacked the institutional capacity to address such problems.
The United Nations Charter did not contemplate the collapse or disintegration of
a state. It presumed effective communication among sovereign governments and their
elites, and a range of action available to the Security Council, including provisional
measures, sanctions short of force, and possibly coercion.17 However, these instrumentalities were designed to bring pressure upon a cohesive form of supra-national,
political organizations: functioning states. By the late twentieth century the problem
of failing states was becoming an urgent challenge,18 and with the September 11, 2001
attacks on world public order, it was apparent that disintegrating and failed states were
“threat[s] to the peace” in the words of the United Nations Charter.19 Since preventing
threats to the peace was a fundamental purpose of the United Nations,20 the world
community came to appreciate that addressing this genre of threat would require new
approaches: strengthening fragile states, and the corollary imperative of reconstructing
failed states through comprehensive nation-building efforts.21

16. This has been so, more or less, since 1648 when the Thirty Years War ended in Europe with the
treaties of Münster and Osnabrück, and the Westphalian State System emerged. Some scholars argue that
the nation-state state system predates 1648. They assert that it originated with the Concordat of Worms in
1122 because the Investiture Struggle established a property right corresponding to sovereign territory as
it established “the right of kings to the income from the territory defined by the domain of each bishop.”
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Popes, Kings and Endogenous Institutions: The Concordat of Worms and the
Origins of Sovereignty, 2 INT’L. STUD. REV. 93, 94 (2000).
17. See U.N. Charter arts. 39-51 (outlining appropriate responses to “threats to the peace, breaches of
the peace, and acts of aggression”).
18. See generally Chester Crocker, Engaging Failing States, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 32.
19. U.N. Charter art. 39.
20. Id. art. 1, para. 1.
21. Because no part of the system effectively helped countries transition from war to peace, Secretary
General Kofi Annan proposed a Peacebuilding Commission, the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change, as a key reform to fill the hole in the United Nations institutional machinery. See The
Secretary-General, Note, Follow-Up to the Outcome of the Millenium Summit, U.N. Doc A/59/565 (Dec.
2, 2004). The U.N. Security Council, acting concurrently with the General Assembly, established the U.N.
Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advisory body in December 2005. See S.C. Res. 1645,
¶ 1, U.N. Doc S/RES/1645 (Dec. 20, 2005). The Commission has a standing Organizational Committee
comprising seven members of the Security Council including the permanent members, seven members of
the Economic and Social Council, five top providers of contributions to the U.N. budget, and five top
providers of military personnel and civilian police to United Nations missions. Id. ¶ 4. International
financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are invited to participate
in meetings of the Commission. Id. ¶ 9. Its main purposes are:
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The character of state sovereignty was changing as states became interdependent
and then adjusted to the many external forces of globalization.22 Such forces included
pressures from the international finance and trade systems, drug cartels, private armies,
and the positive evolution of the international human rights system. These emerging
conditions of international life were buffeting the long presumed robust character of
the sovereign state and its institutions. As was observed by Judge Alvarez in the Corfu
Channel Case:
By sovereignty, we understand the whole body of rights and attributes which a State
possesses in its territory, to the exclusion of all other States, and also in its relations
with other States. Sovereignty confers rights upon States and imposes obligations on
them. . . .
....
This notion has evolved, and we must now adopt a conception of it which will
be in harmony with the new conditions of social life. We can no longer accept
sovereignty as an absolute and individual right of every State . . . . The sovereignty
of States has now become an institution, an international social function of a
psychological character, which has to be exercised in accordance with the new
international law.23

Sovereignty was not absolute.24 It had been changing to reflect the reality of the
world social process, yet sovereignty remained an important technique wielded by state
elites and it performed a stabilizing international function that remained central to
world public order. It had helped solve a problem of the anarchical state system:
“[H]ow is order maintained in international politics?”25 Without order, the fear was
that the international system would collapse into an absolute Hobbesian environment,
for which failed states are a conditioning factor.
However, the old myth was giving way to a view of sovereignty based in part on
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which stated, “The will of the people shall
be the basis of the authority of the government.”26 The old bargain had begun to

(a) [t]o bring together relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose
integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery; (b) [t]o focus attention
on reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict . . .;
and (c) [t]o provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all
relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help
endure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of
attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery.
Id. ¶ 2.
22. See the discussion of sovereign power and the challenge presented by private military actors in this
volume. Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Rise of Outsourcing in Modern Warfare: Sovereign
Power, Private Military Actors, and the Constitutive Process, 60 ME. L. REV. 429 (2008).
23. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 43 (Apr. 9, 1949) (individual opinion of Judge
Alvarez).
24. C. Wilfred Jenks’ observation that “[s]overeignty is not absolute, but divisible” was increasingly
apparent. He had observed that this was “inconceivable to the dogmatic school of thought” represented by
Hobbes’ Leviathan, “which regarded the essence of sovereignty as being its absolute quality.” C. WILFRED
JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 499 (1964).
25. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY 51-73 (1977).
26. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21, para. 3, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
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change from the peoples’ ceding of power to the sovereign in return for security to the
peoples’ ceding of power to the sovereign in return for guarantees of rights. Where
absolute sovereignty was about state security, popular sovereignty is about human
dignity. Popular sovereignty has changed expectations about state behavior and is a
component of both state-building design and the legal architecture of nation-building.27
For states that were pathologically weak, the technique of sovereignty became an
imperfect tool as territorial integrity came under critical challenge.28 Francis
Fukuyama wrote, “Sovereignty and the nation-state, cornerstones of the Westphalian
system, have been eroded in fact and attacked in principle, because what goes on inside
states—in other words, their internal governance—often matters intensely to other
members of the international system.”29 Interventions, both humanitarian and
strategic-based, resulted in the removal of odious regimes and nation-building projects
that assumed traditional state functions. One scholar notes that “[t]he statebuilding
practices of international administrations reveal a sovereignty paradox: international
administrations compromise a fundamental aspect of a political community’s
sovereignty by violating its right to self-governance, but do so with the aim of making
it sovereign with regard to the relations between state and society.”30 In short, for
collapsed states, traditional sovereignty was an empty shell.31

27. United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote in 1992, “While respect for the
fundamental sovereignty and integrity of the state remains central, it is undeniable that the centuries-old
doctrine of absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer stands, and was in fact never so absolute as it was
conceived to be in theory.” Bhoutros Bhoutros-Ghali, Empowering the United Nations, FOREIGN AFF.,
Winter 1992-93, at 89, 98-99. In his 1999 annual speech to the U.N. General Assembly, Secretary-General
Kofi Annan stated,
The sovereign state, in its most basic sense, is being redefined by the forces of globalization
and international cooperation. The State is now widely understood to be the servant of its
people, and not vice versa. . . . [I]t is not the deficiencies of the Charter which have brought
us to this juncture, but our difficulties in applying its principles to a new era—an era when
strictly traditional notions of sovereignty can no longer do justice to the aspirations of
peoples everywhere to attain their fundamental freedoms.
U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 4th plen. mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7136 (Sept. 20, 1999).
28. The principle of territorial integrity of states is a central goal of the United Nations. See U.N.
Charter art. 2, para. 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”).
29. FUKUYAMA, STATE BUILDING, supra note 2, at 92.
30. DOMINIK ZAUM, THE SOVEREIGNTY PARADOX: THE NORMS AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL
STATEBUILDING 27 (2007) (footnote omitted). Zaum further notes that
[t]he institution of sovereignty is central to understanding the normative framework
underlying the statebuilding activities of the international administrations. By establishing
international administrations and denying self-governance to the affected populations, the
international community compromises one of the fundamental aspects of sovereignty, the
norm of self-determination. However, as sovereignty is closely related to the notion of
statehood, arguably even constitutive of it, it is the institution which necessarily incorporates
the relevant elements of the normative framework that shapes statebuilding. The
relationship between sovereignty and statebuilding is therefore a complex and seemingly
contradictory one.
Id.
31. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht concluded that
sovereignty is not in the nature of an absolute and rigid category, but that, being no more
than a bundle of rights, it is capable of division and separation in a manner permitting a real
measure of competence on the part both of the residuary sovereign and of the authority
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Yet the shell, this structure without walls, could suddenly find itself with a roof:
a newly drafted constitutional text. While potentially important, to the population the
new text is often very much a myth. To the nation-building lawyer the new constitution
may appear to apply, while other long-standing normative systems are in fact applied.
This is because societies and communities possess multiple relevant normative
systems. The normative code relied upon by officials is actually a myth system and its
reliability for normative guidance will vary. Often far more important is the unofficial
normative system which operates as the real operational code.32 As the entrenched
normative system of the populace, the operational code will prevail over any new
constitution and codified law.33
This divergence of official and unofficial normative systems was especially
apparent during earlier eras marked by what Noah Feldman has termed “imposed
constitutionalism.” As he writes,
[a]lthough the wholesale imposition of an entire constitutional order is increasingly
rare, constitutions are being drafted and adopted in the shadow of a gun. In the last
decade, in the former Yugoslavia, East Timor, Afghanistan, and . . . Iraq, interim or
permanent constitutions have been drafted under the conditions of de facto or de jure
occupation. Each of the cases has also seen substantial local participation in the
constitutional process; but each has also seen substantial intervention and pressure
imposed from outside to produce constitutional outcomes preferred by international
actors . . . . Yet there is something theoretically and practically distinctive about
imposed liberal constitutionalism today: it takes place against a backdrop of
widespread commitment to democratic self-determination.34

While there are often demands for indigenous participation in the process, the catalyst
is likely to be external—spawned by international actors and nation-building lawyers
who are trained in foreign legal systems. The indigenous commitment may be to a
form of self-determination and to a myth of Western style democracy.
Donald Horowitz raises the real possibility that constitutional design is an
oxymoron, and pointedly writes that “there is no agreement on the political and
constitutional arrangements most likely to be conducive to peace and accommodation
in a democratic context.”35 This is at the base of the problem of constitutional myth

charged with its total or partial exercise.
SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
324-25 (1958).
32. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, FOLDED LIES: BRIBERY, CRUSADES, AND REFORMS 16 (1979).
33. As one scholar classically observed,
I shall continue to do my best to clarify the process and the law of interpretation, of both
words and acts as symbols of expression; to demonstrate that no man can determine the
meaning of written words by merely gluing his eyes within the four corners of a square
paper; to convince that it is men who give meanings to words and that words in themselves
have no meaning . . . .
Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L. Q. 161, 164
(1965).
34. Noah Feldman, Imposed Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 857, 858-59 (2005) (citations
omitted).
35. Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?, in DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS 253, 253-54 (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds., 2000).
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for newly constituted states. The same attention that is devoted to drafting the text
must also be devoted to the process of grounding the new document until the
population of the state accepts it as authoritative. In new states especially, the
constitution is more process than text. As the Roman jurist Papinian wrote, “Lex is a
common engagement of the Republic.”36 In other words, the people assumed a
common responsibility because they participated in assenting to the law. This same
participatory imperative must ground post-conflict constitutive processes in order to
contribute to a stable, governable future that will represent a break with the past. For
example, in post-conflict states such as Afghanistan and Iraq, the constitutive process
must take root in the teahouses and mosques.37
Nation-builders drafting constitutional texts and codified laws must sift through
both the myth system and the operational code in order to determine which processes
of community decisions are both authoritative and controlling. A newly drafted
constitution may be a myth while what people actually do in informal settings is the
accepted code of operation. The experience of most failed states that are candidates
for nation-building is that of a pre-constitutional moment marked by the absence of
political authority and state control. While “[t]he primary function of any constitution
is to manage power, a critical feature of which is the prevention of destructive
conflict,”38 in these settings, power centers are contested and the constitution is not the
prevailing operational code.
Myths serve important functions at every level of community. Plato wrote of the
noble lie to facilitate an ordered and just society.39 There is also the noble lie of
nation-building, and it too serves a just cause. For the interveners and the beneficiaries
(or targets) of nation-building, the whole enterprise must be elevated to a high order
goal of the international community. Jane Stromseth, David Wippman, and Rosa
Brooks have recently observed that
[i]nterventions are a costly and dangerous business, diverting government resources
away from domestic priorities and risking the lives of the intervening power’s
soldiers. The electorates of western nations are often loathe to support expensive,
risky foreign ventures that offer few clear short-term domestic dividends. Because
modern international and domestic norms forbid interventions designed explicitly to
exploit resources of other states, today’s interventionists must generally make a public
commitment to building just, democratic, peaceful and prosperous societies in the
areas that they control, if they are to avoid worldwide condemnation. Yet building

36. CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 50 (rev. ed.1947)
(1940).
37. In Afghanistan, the constitutive process was characterized by discrepancies between preferences
about how decisions are made versus how they should be made. Formal authority was minimal and
dispersed, effective control was spotty and rarely applied from the administrative and governmental center
of the country, Kabul. There had long been a disconnect between formal authority and effective control.
See Charles H. Norchi, Toward the Rule of Law in Afghanistan: The Constitutive Process, in BEYOND
RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN, supra note 2, at 115.
38. Nagan & Hammer, supra note 22, at 430.
39. The “noble lie” was a persuasive device, a myth devised and observed for the common good. See
PLATO, supra note 10, at 93. Indeed, one scholar commenting on Plato’s work notes that “it is baldly
stated [in the Republic] that the only truly just civil society must be founded on a lie.” Allan Bloom,
Preface to PLATO, supra, at xv.
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just and prosperous societies is complex and requires intervening powers to make
virtually open-ended commitments of resources and people to post-intervention
societies—which is, again, likely to be less popular with domestic constituencies
concerned about how their tax dollars are spent.40

The noble lie of nation-building signals to the world community that the cause is just.
The communication might assure populations who must tolerate intervention,
disruption, and occupation while hoping for the pay-off of a functioning state and
human dignity. It might mollify the taxpaying citizen of the intervening country who
foots the bill. It helps to comfort families who lose loved ones serving in far away
lands. The function and limitations of the noble lie must be recognized by nationbuilding participants.
III. SPACE FOR STATE-BUILDING
Ensuring the human dignity of the beneficiary population is one of the
foundational justifications for nation-building projects. As a practical matter, this is
also a precondition for progress on any other reconstruction front. Conditions of
extreme crisis shaped by chaos, indiscriminate killing, targeted attacks, insurgency, and
persistent conflict must be addressed before extensive nation-building can occur. The
continuing problem is that ungoverned space will be filled by chaos because frayed,
faux, and failed states lack the capacity to monopolize power. Security for the
population must be achieved in the earliest phases of nation-building and sustained
throughout the process.
In this writer’s view, the achievement of a condition of centrally-authorized state
power is a critical component of the legal architecture of nation-building. As Francis
Fukuyama has observed, “[i]n post-conflict reconstruction operations, adequate
security is the absolute sine qua non of success.”41 Legal tasks may overlap and be
conducted in parallel with stability operations, because of the need for institutional
coordination in fluid environments.42 Those who have political power use it to achieve
their objectives, and when those objectives are hostile to the goals of nation-building,
those exercises of power must be addressed, by military means or otherwise.
Illegitimate and unauthorized action grounded in sheer power must be curtailed.43
A Rand Corporation nation-building study recently concluded that “[t]he firstorder priorities for any nation-building mission are public security and humanitarian

40. STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 2, at 4.
41. FUKUYAMA, NATION-BUILDING, supra note 2, at 234.
42. U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine holds that it is important
to identify existing coordination mechanisms and incorporate them into comprehensive
[counterinsurgency] efforts. This includes existing U.S. Government, multinational, and
[host-nation] mechanisms. Context is extremely important . . . . The nature of the conflict
and its focus on the populace make civilian and military unity a critical enabling aspect of
a COIN operation.
U.S. ARMY & MARINE CORPS, COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL 69 (2007) [hereinafter
COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL].
43. This includes illegitimate action from all quarters, including the ranks of the nation-builders. Id.
at 42 (“Illegitimate actions are those involving the use of power without authority—whether committed by
government officials, security forces, or counterinsurgents.”).
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assistance.”44 The study prioritizes the relevant tasks in this order: security, humanitarian relief, governance, economic stabilization, democratization, and development.
Always, the first order of business is building the space necessary for nation-building,
and that requires stabilization, peacekeeping, and police and security sector reform.
Security operations cannot be conducted acontextually or absent integrated planning.
Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks observe that “[b]ecause sustainable security requires
at least minimally functioning state institutions, security efforts are meaningful only if
undertaken as part of a larger post-conflict reconstruction and rule of law project.”45
Security is the precondition of effective legal reform, yet security itself is dependent
on the formal existence, at least, of operational law and state institutions.
Because contemporary nation-building typically combines state-building and
military operations, there has been rethinking of the strategic environment in the
American security policy community. United States Army operational themes46 now
explicitly include peacekeeping, peace building, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and
conflict prevention. Along the spectrum of conflict from stable peace, to unstable
peace, to insurgency and general war, peace operations would fall in the middle.47
Much civilian nation-building work occurs in conjunction with Army stability
operations. These operations are described as “various military missions, tasks, and
activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments
of national power to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure environment, provide
essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and
humanitarian relief.”48 The goal of these operations is to help “establish a safe and
secure environment and facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries”
and to “help establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions and support the
transition to legitimate local governance. [They] . . . must maintain the initiative by
pursuing objectives that resolve the causes of instability.”49
Recognizing and resolving the root causes of instability are especially important
and difficult under conditions of insurgency. Afghanistan and Iraq are two contexts
in which nation-building programs have been implemented while counterinsurgency
(COIN) operations50 are conducted. The current U.S. Army and Marine Corps
Counterinsurgency Field Manual connects nation-building goals and civilian
participation to military counterinsurgency operations:

44. DOBBINS ET AL., BEGINNER’S GUIDE, supra note 2, at xxiii; see also id. at 47-72.
45. STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 2, at 140.
46. As the most recent Army field manual notes, “An operational theme describes the character of the
dominant major operation being conducted at any time within a land force commander’s area of operation
. . . . Operational themes have implications for task-organization, resource allocation, protection and
tactical assignment.” DEP’T. OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 2-3 (2008) [hereinafter FIELD MANUAL].
47. Id. at 2-1.
48. Id. at 3-12.
49. Id. (“Stability operations can be conducted in support of a host-nation or interim government or
as part of an occupation when no government exists. Stability operations involve both coercive and
constructive military actions.”).
50. Id. at 2-55 (“Counterinsurgency is those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological,
and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. In counterinsurgency, host-nation forces and
their partners operate to defeat armed resistance, reduce passive opposition, and establish or re-establish
the host-nation government’s legitimacy.”).
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The cornerstone of any COIN effort is establishing security for the civilian populace.
Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented and
disorder spreads. To establish legitimacy, commanders transition security activities
from combat operations to law enforcement as quickly as feasible. When insurgents
are seen as criminals, they lose public support. Using a legal system established in
line with local culture and practices to deal with such criminals enhances the [Host
Nation] government’s legitimacy.51

To achieve this, “[s]oldiers and Marines help establish [host nation] institutions that
sustain that legal regime, including police forces, court systems and penal facilities.”52
Thus, contemporary state-building efforts integrate civilian and military
components. What does this integration mean in concrete terms? One model is the
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), which is designed for service delivery and
basic state-building activities in rural areas where the central government has minimal
or no reach. The configuration of PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq, for instance, vary by
region and supervisory authority. The units are typically staffed by 50 to 300 troops
and include development professionals and diplomats. They generally function in
high-risk environments where there is little non-governmental organization penetration.
The units typically work on infrastructure projects, law and governance, and security
sector reform. Because of the tremendous variability in local conditions in
Afghanistan, “[e]ach PRT leadership team received tremendous latitude to determine
its own strategy.”53 The PRT model is still evolving through experience and application, and has not been without problems. One close observer recommends “the PRTs
should place greater emphasis on capacity-building programs that improve local
governance and help tie local officials and institutions to the central government.”54
However, a model that mixes humanitarian and military components carries risks.
How are the tasks divided? Does the local population understand this integration of
humanitarian and military actors? If there is hostility toward the military operation, do
humanitarian organizations operating in the vicinity face increased risk?
In this Symposium, Winston P. Nagan and Craig Hammer critique the use of
another model used to help create the space for nation-building: Private Military

51. COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 42, at 42. In connecting nation-building and
counterinsurgency,
[t]he field manual stresses the role of politics and outlines an ideal balance of civil and
military responsibilities in COIN. The manual highlights military dependence not simply
upon civilian political direction at all levels of operation, but also upon civilian capacities
in the field. . . . Equally important, success in COIN relies upon nonkinetic activities like
providing electricity, jobs, and a functioning judicial system. This wide swath of operational
capacities for nation-building do not reside in the U.S. armed forces.
Id. at xxix-xxx.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 73.
54. Michael J. McNerney, Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a
Muddle?, PARAMETERS, Winter 2005-06, at 32, 45. McNerney, a senior U.S. government official,
concluded that in Afghanistan, “the PRTs grew increasingly effective in supporting security-sector-related
capacity-building in the provinces. . . . It would be beneficial if the PRTs can also play a role in supporting
judicial capacity-building programs, which the international community has implemented far too slowly.”
Id. at 42-43.
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Contractors (PMCs) and Private Security Contractors (PSCs). Nagan and Hammer
appraise this model and its implications for world order. For instance, they note that
through reliance of PMCs and PSCs, “the line between combat operations and service
delivery has been noticeably indistinct; there has been an alarming lack of clarity as to
when private military actors have assumed combat roles versus when they have been
limited to training, and other non-combat roles.”55 The authors appraise the difficulties
created by the use of these actors that are disconnected from sovereign power, and
argue that these institutions “are not supported by traditional, appropriate sources of
authority, even though national sovereigns are a key part of this process of assigning
sovereign power.”56 They write that “[t]he constitutive implications arising from
military privatization efforts are particularly grave, especially where political leaders
are able to operate outside norm-generating forces, including public scrutiny,
government oversight, and domestic and international law.”57
One alternative to private military and security contractors is greater reliance on
traditional national armies, and the lawyers serving in their ranks. U.S. Army Judge
Advocate Dan E. Stigall urges reliance on the U.S. military because of its unique
combination of capabilities that include legal capacity. He argues,
[m]ilitary assets are the preferred choice for the task of state-building for many
reasons. One reason is that their presence is a generally indispensable element of any
state-building operation. Another reason . . . is the modern military’s diverse and
robust contingent of professionals. The armed forces of the United States regularly
deploy, not only with skilled infantrymen and other “combat arms” soldiers, but with
a host of trained professionals such as physicians, lawyers (Judge Advocates), and
engineers—all of whom are uniformed service members. . . . Specifically in the legal
realm, the armed forces possess a corps of educated, trained, and skilled attorneys
who regularly practice law within the United States and abroad. . . . They are able to
operate in post-conflict states and assist in rebuilding or developing legal
infrastructure.58

This solution meets the “security first” imperative of nation-building. But does it
unevenly tip the civilian-military balance in the architecture of nation-building?
Ensuring the security of the population requires addressing crime. Writing in this
Symposium, James Cavallaro explains this is a matter of “transitional justice,

55. Nagan & Hammer, supra note 22, at 437.
56. Id. at 448.
57. Id. at 433 (footnote omitted).
58. Dan E. Stigall, Comparative Law and State-Building: The “Organic Minimalist” Approach to
Legal Reconstruction, 29 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 40 (2007). Stigall further argues that
[d]elegating the primary responsibility of legal reconstruction to the Judge Advocates whose
presence is already required in post-conflict settings, economizes the assets already in use
while achieving a unity of command which is unattainable with non-governmental entities.
Thus, they are not only suitable for the job of legal reconstruction, but they are, in many
ways, ideal.
Id. at 41.
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democratic stability, and nation-building.”59 He notes that “insufficient attention has
been paid during the transitional era to addressing ordinary crime during transitions
and beyond.”60 Nation-building efforts must devote enhanced attention “to common
crime and to the establishment of transparent, efficient, and democratic police and
criminal justice systems to control it.”61 This requires detailed planning amidst the
rush to state-building. Space for state-building means protecting vulnerable
populations from crime, insurgency, and armed conflict. The problem from the policy
perspective is how to minimize unauthorized coercion and violence. If the well-being
of the population is under threat, if security is absent, there is no space for statebuilding, nowhere to ground the architecture of a new nation.
IV. THINKING BELOW THE STATE
The state as nation-building myth was discussed above.62 Because of the problems
inherent in a state-centric view, it follows that the design process for the legal
architecture of nation-building merits adjustment. At the core of this adjustment, in
this writer’s view, is thinking below the state. This requires adopting a standpoint for
the appraisal of law that penetrates below the easily identifiable surface. Oliver
Wendell Holmes reflected similar thinking, when he famously wrote:
It is perfectly proper to regard and study the law simply as a great anthropological
document. It is proper to resort to it to discover what ideals of society have been
strong enough to reach that final form of expression, or what have been the changes
in dominant ideals from century to century. [Law is] . . . an exercise in the
morphology and transformation of human ideas.63

Vibrant customary communities and microlegal systems function below the radar
of failed and weak states. These communities merit attention because within them
human rights and development are denied or achieved, through them demands are
made upon the world community, and many communities reject certain organizing
principles of world public order including the basic international human rights codex.
Lawyers engaged in failed state and post-conflict reconstruction must acknowledge
individuals and their communities which provide and protect fundamental values and
upon which all governance rests. Whether in functioning or deeply pathological states,
people’s values are indulged or deprived in smaller communities that are mere microparticipants in the world community, but whose participation can occasionally produce
broad and intense effects.64 In all communities, the ultimate systemic unit is the
person.

59. See James L. Cavallaro, Looking Backward to Address the Future? Transitional Justice, Rising
Crime, and Nation-Building, 60 ME. L. REV. 461, 462 (2008).
60. Id. at 464.
61. Id.
62. See supra Part II.
63. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 444 (1899).
64. Indeed, “our world is composed of a series of community contexts beginning with the globe as a
whole and diminishing in territorial range and scope.” Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The
Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 10 (1959).
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Michael Reisman writes in this volume that “[d]evelopment . . . implies specific
scope values with respect to which strategies for securing selective changes are
invented and against which change-flows in decision structures and in the production
and distribution of values are constantly evaluated.”65 This optic is critical as most
state-building occurs in failed states where the principal building blocks are communities. When thinking and operating below the state, it becomes apparent that “as
total systems, societies differ radically in their patterns of values. The differences
reside not only in hierarchies or priorities—the ordering of values according to
importance, in some sense—but also in other important modes of relationships among
values.”66 There are important relationships between values, individual decisionmaking, and collective community choice. As Talcott Parsons noted,
[t]he values which come to be constitutive of the structure of a societal system are
then the conceptions of the desirable type of society held by the members of the
society of reference and applied to the particular society of which they are members.
...
A value-pattern then defines a direction of choice, and consequent commitment
to action.67

A key nation-building development task is thus to appraise the direction of choice
implicit in value aspirations in communities that are often disconnected from the state.
In the absence of a functioning state, it is especially important to understand the
cultural context and to evaluate the deprivation or fulfillment of values which may
underlie institutional manifestations.68 Value priorities differ among cultures. And
institutional practices vary greatly from culture to culture, within and across civilizations. Even the most traditional community is complex, with multiple value and legal
systems at work. Working with traditional communities—often the most coherent
cultural block in failed states—entails the analysis of culture as an “interpretive [task]
in search of meaning.”69
Thinking and working below the state means not confusing legal systems with
legal rules.70 In any community, rules rest on the surface of the legal system. The real
dimensions of the system are often found in other places. This is especially apparent
in traditional villages where customary and formalized councils are both engaged in
choice-making, in dividing up the weal and woe of life.71 One must come to terms with

65. Reisman, supra note 4, at 310.
66. Robin M. Williams, Jr., Change and Stability in Values and Value Systems: A Sociological
Perspective, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN VALUES 15, 17-18 (Milton Rokeach ed., 1979).
67. Talcott Parsons, On the Concept of Value-Commitments, 38 SOC. INQUIRY 135, 136 (1968)
(citation omitted).
68. See generally FRANCIS MADING DENG, TRADITION AND MODERNIZATION: A CHALLENGE FOR LAW
AMONG THE DINKA OF THE SUDAN (1971) (applying a contextual analysis to institutions within tribal
communities, using the Dinka people as a case study).
69. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 5 (1973).
70. As Bronislaw Malinowski urged, “[t]he true problem is not to study how human life submits to
rules—it simply does not; the real problem is how the rules become adapted to life.” BRONISLAW
MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY 127 (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1966) (1926).
71. See W. Michael Reisman, Law from the Policy Perspective, in MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & W.
MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 1, 6-9 (1981).
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other processes within the culture and the society if one is to truly understand law in
context.72 A legal system may have more to do with custom, religion, or tradition than
with what might be considered modern social conventions. Unwritten law, emanating
from political process, is an important feature of community decision-making.73
There is also a distinction between the terms law and rule of law. In nation-building practice, the latter is typically taken to mean a sector that includes the judiciary,
ministry of justice, lawyers, legal codes, mechanisms, and practices that regulate public
and private life.74 A group of scholars has offered a “rule of law” definition that they
believe affords a more synergistic approach to law and nation-building:
The “rule of law” describes a state of affairs in which the state successfully monopolizes the means of violence, and in which most people, most of the time, choose to
resolve disputes in a manner consistent with the procedurally fair, neutral, and
universally applicable rules, and in a manner that respects fundamental human rights
norms (such as prohibitions on racial, ethnic, religious and gender discrimination,
torture, slavery, prolonged arbitrary detentions, and extrajudicial killings). In the
context of today’s globally interconnected world, this requires modern and effective
legal institutions and codes, and it also requires a widely shared cultural and political
commitment to the values underlying these institutions and codes.75

Thinking and acting below the state means engaging microlegal processes because
“law, real law, is found in all human relations, from the simplest, briefest encounter
between two people to the most inclusive and permanent type of interaction.”76
Accordingly, “[l]aw is a property of interaction. Real law is generated, reinforced,
changed and terminated continually in the course of almost all of human activity.”77
This law, termed “microlaw” by Michael Reisman, “manifests a constitutional
dimension[,] . . . a constitutive process: part of every decision is concerned, not with
the immediate decision, but with the structure of decision-making itself.”78 Through
expectations, reciprocity, and retaliation within those communities that function
independently of formal institutions, “[m]icrolaw is effective and sanctioned.”79 The

72. John Henry Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the Common
Law, in NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR A COMMON LAW OF EUROPE 195, 222-29 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1978).
As Merryman observes,
if we are really interested in knowing something about the legal system in any society we
quickly have to expand our vision to include the law machine—the complex of legal
structures, actors and processes. We will not get very far in that effort by studying merely
the rules of law.
Id. at 227.
73. Diogenes, discussing Plato’s view on the law, observed that “there is a written and an unwritten
law. The one by which we regulate our constitutions in our cities is the written law; that which arises from
custom, is the unwritten law.” DIOGENES LAERTIUS, THE LIVES AND OPINIONS OF EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS
143 (C.D. Yonge trans., 1853).
74. See DOBBINS ET AL., BEGINNER’S GUIDE, supra note 2, at 73-74.
75. STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 2, at 78.
76. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS 2 (1999).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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legal architects of nation-building must plan for and take account of these micro-legal
processes.
In this Symposium, Thomas Barfield considers microlaw, multiple legal systems,
and the need to devote close attention to customary law in nation-building. He writes,
Afghanistan’s restoration of the rule of law has set in motion a renewed debate about
fundamental rights and legal principles that has not been seen in the West since the
time of the Enlightenment: Who is justice for? Who has the right to seek
compensation or justice? Does the state or the individual have priority in seeking
justice and delivering punishment? Is law a human creation or is it rooted in divine
authority?80

The problem, as Barfield observes, is that “so many areas of Afghanistan have
operated without (or outside of) formal government institutions for a very long time.”81
Neither international law nor state law has had traction at the local level. In order to
know the law in Afghanistan, one cannot solely rely on formal agreements and other
textual statements.
In addition, one must also observe habitual behavior. Behavior which in the
beginning might be considered unlawful, if repeated through a period of time, might
become regarded as lawful. To make the distinction requires observance of a flow of
behavior and a flow of words.82 The fundamental role of the state in legal prescription
and application is questioned by many Afghans who wonder, “[i]s state authority a
good idea? Who should set the terms of agreement? Who should determine the rights
and the wrongs?”83 As with many populations that have survived state failure, for most
Afghans legal life does not unfold with reference to formal codes and institutions. Yet,
as Barfied argues,
[T]he major role of the international community has been in aiding the reconstruction
of the Afghan state . . . . One reason that Afghan society has survived so many years
of turmoil has been its ability to govern itself at the local level even in the absence of
state institutions. The international community should take advantage of this strength
by recognizing that most problems are not solved in the formal judicial institutions
but rather informally.84

Thus, close attention must be accorded to the cultures that shape communities and
people apart from the state.85 Viewing cultures and civilizations via a horizontal optic
alone reveals only surface identifications. With a vertical examination, the full
complexity of overlapping and conflicting identifications accompanied by expectations
and demands become apparent. Normative systems are layered. Hence, levels of

80. Thomas Barfield, Culture and Custom in Nation-Building: Law in Afghanistan, 60 ME. L. REV.
347, 348 (2008).
81. Id.
82. See W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, The Harold D.
Lasswell Memorial Lecture (April 24, 1981), in 75 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 101, 108-11.
83. Barfield, supra note 80, at 348.
84. Id. at 373.
85. See id. Culture “is the term that characterizes the most distinctive patterns of value distribution and
institutional practice to be found in the world community.” MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & HAROLD D.
LASSWELL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 20 (1960).

298

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:2

governance, constitutional texts, and formal institutions are features of a context that
include, but are not limited to, the state. This discernment operation can be especially
vexing to those who work with non-Western communities, where social processes
evolve below the surface of the community.
Social groups within the state typically receive scant attention from practitioners
and scholars. For example, as is explained by Tracy E. Higgins and Rachel Fink in this
Symposium, in every nation-building context, the family is part of the legal architecture
through “the relationship between family structure and the overarching social structure
of the nation-state.”86 The authors note that “[t]he family comprises the fundamental
principle of social organization in all societies, across a wide range of culture and
political forms.”87 Family and social hierarchy, including hierarchy and power
constellations, may be “reproduced in the structure of the nation.”88 Gender roles and
particular manifestations of family structure may be reinforced by long-standing
customary law.
In placing family law at the center of a legal architecture of nation-building,
Higgins and Fink note that “the social institution of the family and the legal framework
that defines it embody power relations that, in turn, help to shape the larger polity . . .
[and] may figure in important ways in the struggle for national identity that often takes
place contemporaneously with nation-building.”89 The authors approach nationbuilding differently than do lawyers and scholars who are accustomed to a world of
formal institutions, codified law, and top-down methods. When a “below the state”
observational standpoint is incorporated and adopted, nation-building lawyers can
better calibrate the tools and jurisprudence they bring to the enterprise in order to
achieve commonly sought outcomes.
V. HUMAN RIGHTS FOR HUMAN DIGNITY
The fundamental goal of nation-building is achieving human dignity for the
beneficiary population.90 In this Symposium, Michael Reisman postulates the goal of
a world order of human dignity, and this “involves increasing the aggregate
participation in the shaping and sharing of all values.”91 That is the full nation-building
task. In modern state-building practice, this means constructing a human rights culture
in compliance with international human rights standards, and national and international
protection mechanisms as strategies to achieve human dignity outcomes. In many
instances, populations in failed and disintegrated states have suffered human rights
abuses for generations. There is evidence that deep and extensive human rights

86. Tracy E. Higgins & Rachel Fink, Gender and Nation-Building: Family Law as Legal Architecture,
60 ME. L. REV. 375, 385 (2008).
87. Id. at 386.
88. Id. at 407.
89. Id. at 377.
90. According to scholars Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell, “[t]he essential meaning of
human dignity . . . can be succinctly stated: it refers to a social process in which values are widely and not
narrowly shared, and in which private choice, rather than coercion, is emphasized as the predominant
modality of power.” McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 64, at 11.
91. Reisman, supra note 4, at 312.
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deprivations over time are a factor in state collapse.92 In post-conflict reconstruction
and nation-building, human rights design must be integrated at the outset and
considered within every project that will have an impact on the beneficiary population.
Human rights have been central to state-building and post-conflict reconstruction
since the end of the Second World War when, with the Holocaust fresh in their minds,
delegates to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco decided that how a
government treated its own people on its own soil would no longer be its own business.
The constitutive document of the new organization, the United Nations Charter,
reaffirmed “faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.”93 The
framers of the Charter recognized evolving demands for human rights, postulating and
prescribing new protections for fundamental rights of the individual regardless of the
posture of the state in which that citizen lived.94 The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) has been called a Magna Carta for all humanity.95 It is the constitutive
text at the core of the International Bill of Human Rights and at the core of the legal
architecture of nation-building.96
Nation-building work cannot be undertaken without incorporating human rights
standards and obligations, as well as the mechanisms and arrangements for promotion
and protection. It cannot proceed without the participation of the human rights
“movement” that is largely drawn from civil society. Building a human rights culture
requires partnerships and national human rights institutions as a component of the
architectural design.97 Human rights, as a component of the legal architecture of
nation-building, are addressed explicitly and implicitly by each contributor to this
Symposium.
The issue of culturally particular perspectives and demands as a challenge to
universal standards is a human rights problem that becomes acute when Western

92. Much has been written on the connection between widespread human rights abuses over time and
the collapse of the state. For the situation in Afghanistan, see generally U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council
[ECOSOC], Report of the Independent Counsel on International Human Rights on the Human Rights
Situation in Afghanistan, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/42/8 (Nov. 17, 1987); EDWARD GIRARDET & JONATHAN
WALTER, AFGHANISTAN (Charles Norchi & Mirwais Massood eds., 2004); A HELSINKI WATCH REPORT,
“TEARS, BLOOD AND CRIES”: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE THE INVASION (1984); A HELSINKI
WATCH/ASIA WATCH REPORT, BY ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT: VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR IN
AFGHANISTAN (1988); Norah Niland, Justice Postponed: The Marginalization of Human Rights in
Afghanistan, in NATION-BUILDING UNRAVELED? AID, PEACE AND JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN 61 (Antonio
Donini, Norah Niland & Karin Wermester eds., 2004).
93. U.N. Charter, Preamble.
94. See Charles Norchi, Human Rights: A Global Common Interest, in THE UNITED NATIONS:
CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGES OF A GLOBAL SOCIETY 79 (Jean E. Krasno ed., 2004).
95. ROBERT F. DRINAN, THE MOBILIZATION OF SHAME: A WORLD VIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 11 (2001).
96. See Fact Sheet, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev. 1), The
International Bill of Human Rights (June 1996), http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs2.htm. The
International Bill of Human Rights consists of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, two Optional Protocols and specialized
international legal instruments. Id.
97. National human rights institutions, as strategies for building a human rights culture, should be
considered in nation-building design. See, e.g., Charles H. Norchi, The National Human Rights
Commission of India as a Value-Creating Institution, in HUMAN RIGHTS: POSITIVE POLICIES IN ASIA AND
THE PACIFIC RIM (John D. Montgomery ed., 1998).
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countries undertake nation-building programs in non-Western societies.98 The
perspectives of certain civilizations seemed wary, if not hostile, to what Richard Falk
called “the cult of modernization”99 with which certain cultures associate the human
rights system. In distinctly non-Western contexts, perspectives on a range of values
bearing on human dignity may vary from international legal standards. This is a
concrete problem which lawyers, including this writer, have confronted in non-Western
nation-building environments. Its urgency was recently conveyed by Pope Benedict
XVI in an address to the United Nations General Assembly:
[T]he Universal Declaration [of Human Rights] . . . has enabled different cultures,
juridical expressions and institutional models to converge around a fundamental
nucleus of values, and hence of rights. Today, though, efforts need to be redoubled
in the face of pressure to reinterpret the foundations of the Declaration and to
compromise its inner unity so as to facilitate a move away from the protection of
human dignity towards the satisfaction of simple interests, often particular interests.100

Burns Weston, writing in this Symposium, proposes a practical means for dealing
with this problem. He argues that “universalist international human rights law can and
should serve as a basis for rendering cross-cultural normative judgments.”101
Historically, deprivations of respect are the roots of abuses suffered by vulnerable
populations in failed states. Professor Weston proposes “an analytically neutral
approach for deciding when cultural differences are to be respected and when not.”102
He refers to this approach as a “methodology of respect,”103 and urges a “cross-cultural
dialogue that can yield substantial detailed consensus on the many factual and policyoriented questions that absolutely need to be asked by all participants engaged in
nation-building.”104
Additionally, nation-building, particularly in war-torn societies, requires protecting
refugee populations and the internally displaced. In this Symposium, Rebecca M. M.
Wallace and Diego Quiroz discuss means for protecting refugees and the internally

98. Charles H. Norchi, A Pivotal States Human Rights Strategy, in THE PIVOTAL STATES: A NEW
FRAMEWORK FOR U.S. POLICY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 315, 327-28 (Robert Chase, Emily Hill & Paul
Kennedy eds., 1999).
[S]chism has arisen between those who believe ideas and institutions are nomos, or made
by man, and those who believe our ideoethnemes are physis, or imposed by nature or divine
will. The former view engendered Western civilization from the Enlightenment to the
present, and with it human rights. In its extreme form, the latter view is a crucial challenge.
Its triumph would amount to one of the most profound value shifts since the Age of Reason.
And its impact on the planet would be no less significant than when God first spoke to
Muhammad.
Id.
99. Richard Falk, Cultural Foundations for the International Protection of Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 44, 45 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim ed., 1990).
100. Address of His Holiness Benedict XVI to the United Nations General Assembly 2 (April 18, 2008)
(transcript available from the Holy See Press Office).
101. Burns H. Weston, Human Rights and Nation-Building in Cross-Cultural Settings, 60 ME. L. REV.
317, 326 (2008).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 328.
104. Id. at 346.
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displaced (IDPs) as a critical nation-building challenge.105 They “explore the interdependent relationship between post-conflict nation-building on the one hand, and
refugee repatriation and intrastate reintegration of IDPs on the other.”106 The authors
appraise the framework of international protection of refugees through human rights
law and international refugee law that must serve to guide nation-building actors. They
write that “[i]n any population of returnees there will be groups that are particularly
vulnerable. Any successful nation-building exercise must consider these groups and
implement procedures and programs that effectively address their particular situations.”107
Human rights must be a key component of the legal architecture of nationbuilding because many populations of failed states have been subjected to the Melian
experience. Thucydides recorded the famous Melian dialogue during the time of the
Peloponnesian wars. In the dialogue, the Athenians proclaimed that the “strong do
what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”108 There was no human rights
culture, and the Melians suffered the consequences. For contemporary nation-building,
the legal architect must address the means and methods of building a human rights
culture to secure the population early in the design process.
VI. CAPACITY-BUILDING
What is the “building” in nation-building? This writer believes it is building the
capacity of people and their institutions. Among development professionals, capacity
is understood as the ability of people, organizations, and society to manage their affairs
successfully.109 Thus the legal architecture of nation-building should adopt Amartya
Sen’s “capability approach” that he applies to poverty reduction.110 The 2005 Paris
Declaration identified capacity development as an endogenous process, led from within
a country with donors playing a supporting role. The effective performance of country
systems—administration, governance, goods and service delivery, a suitable policy,
regulatory and legal environment for sustainable development—depends on capacity.111

105. Rebecca M. M. Wallace and Diego Quiroz, Refugees and Internally Displaced: A Challenge to
Nation-Building, 60 ME. L. REV. 409 (2008).
106. Id. at 410-11.
107. Id. at 424.
108. THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 351 (Richard Crawley trans., 1982).
109. See generally Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development Assistance Committee,
Reference Document, The Challenge of Capacity Development: Working Towards Good Practice,
available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance.
110. AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 109 (1992). Amartya Sen considers the concept of
“development” beyond resource transfer and material well-being. He defines the goal of development as
increasing the capability of all human beings to achieve what they most value. See generally AMARTYA
SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).
111. Montgomery & Rondinelli, supra note 2, at 235.
The in-country presence of donor organizations is often a useful means of training civil
servants and suggesting organization improvements, but the negative impact of its
temporary nature often contributes to an internal “brain-drain” as higher levels of
compensation and responsibility attract qualified personnel away from government posts.
The balance between offering opportunities to qualified personnel and drawing down the
resources of the public service requires close attention. Using existing administrative
machinery rather than creating new organizations is a valuable means toward that balance,
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This is a way to solve the problem of what Fukuyama calls “weak states and the black
hole of public administration.”112
Sustainable capacity-building depends upon a core skill: individual decisionmaking. This is critical for a range of optimal outcomes, including an independent
judiciary, competent and responsive legal professionals, adequate public health,
inclusive education, and the full range of ministerial and provincial government
administration. Building indigenous, individual decision-making capacity should be
a component of the legal architecture of nation-building because “[l]aw is a process of
human beings making choices.”113 Nation-building lawyers, who become decision
specialists through years of training and practice, are best positioned to help develop
this core capacity upon which the new state will rise or fall. The ability of a state to
produce value outcomes for a population turns on the decision capacity of individuals
at every level of social structure but, in particular, at the base. This core capacity is a
prerequisite for generating the complete range of value outcomes described by Michael
Reisman in this Symposium: power, well-being, skill, respect, wealth, enlightenment,
affection, and rectitude.114
Capacity-building efforts should explicitly recognize the community or group’s
values to help them guide their views of their own futures.115 The impoverished and
dispossessed are too often treated as objects of state-building rather than as genuinely
participating subjects. However, they are agents of their choices.116 As one
development expert has observed, “The poor want desperately to have their voices
heard, to make decisions, and not to always receive the law handed down from
above.”117 The goal is to build locally-driven, owned, and thus sustainable processes
in select sectors amidst widespread conditions of physical insecurity and socioeconomic deprivation.
Another scholar argues that rather than focus upon services, infrastructure, and
capital transfers, donor countries and international organizations must define capacity
itself as the primary objective of all development assistance.118 This can help avoid the
problem of “runaway state-building,” described as the “rapid expansion in the size of
the state administration without appreciable gains in its effectiveness [whereby] states
continue to underperform, and in some cases have even declined in their capacity for

once disruptive relics of the past are purged from office.
Id.
112. FUKUYAMA, STATE BUILDING, supra note 2, at 43.
113. W. MICHAEL REISMAN & A. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND SHAPING LAW
595 (1987).
114. See Reisman, supra note 4, at 311-13.
115. See generally Charles H. Norchi & Karuna Chibber, A Technical Note for Value-Based
Participatory Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation in Community-Driven Development (World Bank
Group, Washington, D.C., May 20, 2003) (discussing the guidelines for Value-Based Participatory
Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation in Community-Driven Development).
116. See W. Michael Reisman, A Jurisprudence from the Perspective of the “Political Superior,” 23
N. KY. L. REV. 605, 619 (1996). Reisman suggests a methodological approach to building the decision
capacity of the disempowered. Id.
117. DEEPA NARAYAN ET AL., VOICES OF THE POOR: CRYING OUT FOR CHANGE 281 (2000).
118. See FUKUYAMA, STATE BUILDING, supra note 2, at 82-91.
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governance.”119 The risk is building the capacity of international consultants and nongovernmental organizations while people remain disempowered and fragile states
remain weak. It is important to be sensitive to approaches that create new external
dependencies an outcome of what one expert famously termed, “The Cartel of Good
Intentions.”120 This “cartel” is the enormous international development technocracy
that is self-perpetuating and feeds on large foreign assistance projects while producing
local dependency.121 In the least developed countries it has contributed to minimal
state capacity, and economic growth, thwarted service delivery in an inclusive and
accountable manner, and enhanced the risk of political instability and state collapse.
The cure for runaway state-building is real capacity-building.122
The contributors to this Symposium address a broad spectrum of capacity-building
challenges. One challenge, not explicitly treated in this volume, is constitutional text
drafting for new states.123 Lawyers engaged in nation-building are especially attuned
to the constitutive process, even if they do not participate in drafting the text. The
process is at least as important in the life of the new state as the text.124 The legal
architecture must account for the observations of Donald L. Horowitz:
There are two important questions in post-conflict constitution making, and at present
neither of them has a definitive or uniformly accepted answer. The first relates to the
best configuration of institutions to adopt in order to ameliorate the problem of
intergroup conflict. The second concerns the process most apt to produce the best
configuration of institutions, whatever it might be.125

There are multiple answers to these questions depending on the context, methods, and
jurisprudence that lawyers bring to the problem.126 A constitution is a journey, not a

119. CONOR O’DWYER, RUNAWAY STATE-BUILDING 1 (2006).
120. William Easterly, The Cartel of Good Intentions: The Problem of Bureaucracy in Foreign Aid, 5
POL’Y REFORM 223, 226 (2003).
121. See Peter Boone, Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid, 40 EUR. ECON. REV. 289, 289-94
(1996); James Bovard, The Continuing Failure of Foreign Aid (Cato Inst., Policy Analysis No. 65, 1986);
Craig Burnside & David Dollar, Aid, Policies and Growth, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 847, 847-48 (2000); see
generally WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH: ECONOMISTS’ ADVENTURES AND
MISADVENTURES IN THE TROPICS (2001) (discussing how economic growth in the tropics responds to
incentives).
122. A possible solution is “an ‘organic minimalist’ approach to legal reconstruction—an approach
aimed at efficiently focusing resources in a way that empowers the organic legal system of the target nation
without undermining the legitimacy of the judiciary and other government institutions.” Stigall, supra note
58, at 1.
123. The more important constitutive process of which a constitution is a part, however, is explicitly
treated in this Symposium. See e.g., Reisman, supra note 4, at 312; Barfield, supra note 80, at 349-51.
124. Norchi, supra note 37, at 115 (“The tradition of creating and adopting a constitution involves a
process of authoritative decision-making in which members of a community clarify and implement their
common interest.”).
125. Donald L. Horowitz, Conciliatory Institutions and Constitutional Processes in Post-Conflict States,
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1213, 1213 (2008).
126. See Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Process, in THE ARCHITECTURE
OF DEMOCRACY: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, AND DEMOCRACY 15, 19 (Andrew
Reynolds ed., 2002) (“If there is a subject called constitutional design, then there must be alternative
constitutional designs. Assuredly there are, but even now most constitutional drafters and reformers are,
at best, only vaguely informed by anything resembling an articulate theory of their enterprise.”).
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moment. For a nascent state emerging from collapse, an often overlooked role for the
nation-building lawyer is to help build local capacity to make the journey.127
The pace of capacity-building will necessarily turn on levels of crisis and conflict.
In this volume, Michael Reisman writes of different levels of developmental capacity
across communities.
At one extreme, the most minimal form of development capacity obtains when a
territorial community lacks institutional or functional means for locating itself, with
some degree of realism, in its environment and flow of events and of even clarifying
and projecting goals and strategies for securing an approximation of human dignity.128

Nation-building lawyers may encounter this as the faux state—a polity whose real
power lies in diffuse pockets disconnected from the center—where effective control
and authority of the government is confined to a narrow space. A constitution might
be in place, government ministries might buzz with activity, yet warlords and their
private armies control provinces, engage in banditry, and “tax” commerce. The faux
state problem must be addressed by intense indigenous capacity-building.
Capacity-building in many new states may be burdened by debts incurred by
previous, often outlaw, regimes. The problem is appraised in this volume by Lee C.
Buchheit and G. Mitu Gulati who write “in this one area—debt contracts—the former
despot will continue to keep a chokehold on the country long after the devil and his
other works have been buried.”129 The “debt obligations incurred by the prior government in the name of the state,”130 merits greater sustained attention from the nationbuilding community. It is a problem that is an obstruction to capacity-building. Moreover, a large part of the solution lies in building indigenous capacity that possesses
sufficient debt-contracting and other related skills.
Among the pathologies of failed and post-conflict states is the absence of
commercial law. In this Symposium, Michael J. Stepek writes on commercial law as
a component of the legal architecture of nation-building.131 There is a dire need for
legal standards to hold public institutions accountable. This accountability is a key to
economic development because “legal institutions enable commercial partners to
engage in sophisticated transactions.”132 The ability to conduct transactions, provide
professional services, and to enter into legally binding agreements requires robust legal
institutions and capable staffs. As Mr. Stepek describes, this is an enormous capacitybuilding challenge that has been fraught with difficulty.

127. A method used by policy-oriented lawyers is the Decision Seminar which this Author has found
useful in state-building field applications. See generally Andrew R. Willard & Charles H. Norchi, The
Decision Seminar as an Instrument of Power and Enlightenment, 14 POL. PSYCHOL. 575 (1993) (an
account of a Decision Seminar conducted to help build governance, constitution making, and decision
capacity for the Afghan government-in-exile and other key participants of the period).
128. Reisman, supra note 4, at 310.
129. Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Odious Debts and Nation-Building: When the Incubus Departs,
60 ME. L. REV. 477, 479 (2008).
130. Id.
131. See generally Michael J. Stepek, The Importance of Commercial Law in the Legal Architecture
of Post-Conflict “New” States, 60 ME. L. REV. 487 (2008).
132. Id. at 494.
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John L. Douglas writes in this volume about a related concern: the role of a
banking system in nation-building. This is an important capacity-building task because
a “banking system functions as the heart and lifeblood of any functioning economy.”133
Mr. Douglas explains why “one no more builds a nation by establishing a banking
system than one builds a nation by writing a constitution.”134 The banking system
requires concurrent attention to other capacity building tasks: “a legal system that
respects contracts and agreements, honoring the rights of both debtors and creditors . . .
a judiciary that follows the rule of law[,] a government that understands the importance
of strong, healthy banks . . . and a legal framework within which they can operate.”135
This component of the legal architecture of nation-building is critical because, as Mr.
Douglas writes, a “healthy banking system . . . not only helps build a nation for what
it does, it helps build a nation for what it requires.”136
There are myriad opportunities for lawyers and non-lawyers to help build the
capacity of failed states and of the people who live in them. This Symposium issue
includes contributions by volunteer lawyers associated with the International Senior
Lawyers Project, who describe their rich field experiences. These lawyers recount
their capacity-building efforts undertaken with a wide range of public and private
actors. Each volunteer lawyer came away from the experience as seasoned nationbuilders with profound insights. As one volunteer reflected after her experience, “[t]he
size of the gap between the law on the books and its access by and application to all
levels of a society is one crucial indicator of a country’s progress on the rule of law
continuum.”137 We are reminded that important capacity-building work is not the
unique preserve of the civil servants of international organizations, government
officials, NGO staff, and law firms. There is an emerging cadre of nation-builders
motivated by nothing more than a custodial sense for the greater common interest.
Capacity-building recognizes that people “have the latent capabilities needed for
development but those latent capabilities need to be nurtured and brought to fruition
if the people are to attain their aspiration, goal, or promise.”138 Nation-builders must
convey a sincerity of purpose and commitment to populations who worry that
compassion fatigue will set in and who fear that they will be victims of a nationbuilding exit strategy.139 Such populations have been orphaned before, usually by
powerful nation-building Western states. In the myth of Prometheus, as the Greek
gods were molding the first mortal beings from fire and earth, they equipped them with
various resources to survive. However, those mortals with reason, the humans, were
left with few powers. Thus Prometheus stole fire from the god Hephaestus and wisdom
in the arts from Athena and gave these powers to man. But, in allocating powers,

133. John L. Douglas, The Role of a Banking System in Nation-Building, 60 ME. L. REV. 511, 512
(2008).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 513.
137. Linda D. McGill, Measuring the Rule of Law in India: A Volunteer Lawyer’s Experience, 60 ME.
L. REV. 537, 537-38 (2008).
138. DEAN WILLIAMS, REAL LEADERSHIP 223 (2005).
139. See Charles H. Norchi, A New Start in Afghanistan, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Oct. 13, 2004,
available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/10/12/opinion/ednorchi.php (arguing that an Afghan election
must not be an exit strategy).
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Prometheus parsed skill, allotting it to some people and not others.140 He skipped the
poorest and most marginal communities. In our age, the orphans of Prometheus are
found in failing, failed, and collapsed states. Building the skill capacity of the new
Promethean orphans is a critical nation-building objective.
VII. THE LAWYER AS ARCHITECT
Nation-building tasks now benefit from the contributions of lawyers. Their
profound challenge is to fulfill the human rights and development of populations on
the perilous journey from real estate to nation-state.141 This is not entirely new legal
territory, but the complex challenges stimulate new approaches, methods, and
innovative combinations. It will occur to the readers of this Symposium that if a legal
architecture of nation-building is emerging, it is because lawyers, such as the
contributors to this volume, are the architects. They are lawyer-architects by virtue of
applying their legal disciplines, their deep contextual understanding, their problemoriented postures, and their multi-method agility to this vexing problem of the Public
Order of the World Community.
Even for the most agile and creative lawyers, this pursuit is remarkable because
there are few guides for the lawyer as nation-building architect.142 The problem, as
historian Eric Hobsbawm once described, is “the old maps and charts which guided
human beings, singly and collectively, through life no longer represent the landscape
through which we move, the sea on which we sail.”143 Hence lawyers engaged in statebuilding are devising new maps and blueprints that are the emerging legal architecture
of nation-building. The most effective and seasoned lawyers employ “a set of
conceptions and working methods that permit and help them to grasp the context in
which they operate, the objectives they are trying to achieve, the obstructions likely to
be encountered and some appropriate method for making choices.”144 Working in
fluid and often contested environments, these lawyer-architects arrive at a “way of
establishing and appraising social goals and values as a necessary step in determining
how problems should be solved.”145 In this manner, they are working in the common
interest of failed states, their sub-communities, and the world community.146
In this early twenty-first century, our diacritic world community still holds pockets
of neglected darkness—failed and failing states, conflict zones within porous
boundaries of faux states, and sub-state communities that have never benefited from
the fruits of development. These places devoid of human dignity present problems.

140. See PLATO, PROTAGORAS 13-16 (C.C.W. Taylor trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1976).
141. See Charles Norchi, From Real Estate to Nation-State: Who will Lead Afghanistan?, DISSENT,
Winter 2006, at 24.
142. See Horowitz, supra note 35, at 270 (“There are enormous disjunctions between what severely
divided societies require and the methods that are used to decide on the institutions that will govern those
societies.”).
143. ERIC HOBSBAWM, AGE OF EXTREMES 16 (1994).
144. REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 113, at 10.
145. Id.
146. See MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 409 (1980) (defining an “interest” as “a pattern of demands for values plus the
supporting expectations about the conditions under which these demands can be fulfilled”).
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They are problems for the people who live in them, and they are problems for the
people of the world community. Such places of disintegration and desperation are
prime platforms to export violence. They swell and simmer below what may resemble
a functioning state. When states disintegrate, and when communities are ultramarginalized, human dignity dissipates. The effects can be global. A neglected
community that descends into extreme insecurity can facilitate the application of power
to distant places. Since September 11, 2001, this is how personal insecurity traveled
with the world politics of our time. We are now learning that the long-term solutions
are in nation-building, fulfilling human rights, and achieving development.
Each contributor to this Symposium addresses some aspect of the state-building
problem as profoundly framed by Sigmund Freud:
[R]eplacement of the power of the individual by the power of the community
constitutes the decisive step in civilization . . . . The first requisite of civilization,
therefore, is that of justice—that is, the assurance that a law once made will not be
broken in favour of an individual . . . . The final outcome should be a rule of law . . .
which leaves no one . . . at the mercy of brute force.147

For the lawyer as nation-building architect, that is the ultimate challenge. In Plato’s
Republic there were Guardians who “were entirely eager to do what they believe to be
advantageous to the city and would in no way be willing to do what is not.”148 Our age
of seemingly permanent reconstruction urgently needs guardian lawyers.149 As Plato’s
Guardians were charged with looking upon his constructed commonwealth as their
special concern, today’s guardian lawyers would be custodians of nascent commonwealths under construction. They would be the lawyer architects of nation-building.
That guardian ideal is conveyed by the authors who have contributed to this
Symposium, Nation-Building: A Legal Architecture?

147. SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 42 (1961).
148. PLATO, supra note 10, at 92.
149. I am grateful to historian Geoffrey Kabaservice for the guardianship metaphor which he used in his
seminal work on pivotal figures of the American liberal establishment. See GEOFFREY KABASERVICE, THE
GUARDIANS: KINGMAN BREWSTER, HIS CIRCLE, AND THE RISE OF THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT (2004).

